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INTRODUCTION
Viral species jumps (also called host jumps) occur when a virus acquires the ability to infect and spread among individuals of a new host species. Historical examples of animal viruses that jumped into human hosts include HIV (from chimpanzees), SARS coronavirus (from bats) and influenza A virus (from birds). Globally, these viruses have exacted high socioeconomic and health costs. The ability to predict viral species jumps may reduce such costs by enabling swifter outbreak mitigation strategies and preventing initial or secondary human infections. In the long term, developing a deeper understanding of how species jumps occur may enable detection of animal viruses that have a higher risk of jumping to human hosts. In this case, human infections could be reduced or prevented by culling infected animals, deploying prophylactic drugs or restricting contacts between infected animals and humans.
The idea that viral species jumps can be predicted is a contentious one, and several of the underlying disagreements are semantic.
First is the distinction between species jumps and spillover events. A species jump is defined by efficient spread by a pathogen within a new host species that was not previously susceptible to that pathogen.
Viruses attain the ability to jump species through the acquisition of genetic changes that allow infection and successful replication within new host cells, as well as successful transmission to other hosts or vector organisms (Parrish et al. 2008) . By contrast, a spillover event is defined by episodic infection within a non-typical host species by a pathogen that cannot spread sustainably among individuals of that nontypical host. Thus, sustained spread (or transmission) does not occur in spillover hosts, and outbreaks will not occur if pathogen transmission from the animal reservoir is prevented (Palmer 2007 , Nugent 2011 . Species jumps from animals to humans therefore pose greater risks than spillover of zoonotic pathogens (animal pathogens that are infectious to humans) because spillover events are self-limiting, while species-jumping pathogens can spread from human to human. Despite the higher risk they pose, species jumps are far rarer than spillover events, although spillover events may subsequently evolve into species jumps.
Because spillover events are more common, most current emerging infectious disease (EID) surveillance programs have been designed to detect spillover events into human populations, and even to predict them by detecting zoonotic pathogens in animal reservoirs. The Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center's Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (AFHSC-GEIS) and the United
Species jump
Efficient spread by a pathogen within a new host species that was not previously susceptible to that pathogen (Parrish et al. 2008) .
Spillover event
Episodic infection within a non-typical host species by a pathogen that cannot spread sustainably among individuals of that non-typical host (Nugent 2011 States Agency for International Development (USAID) have funded major initiatives to improve global detection and identification of emerging pathogens in humans and animals, and to enhance disease outbreak response capabilities (IOM 2007; IOM 2009; Sueker et al. 2010; Russell et al. 2011) . Much of this research is concerned with discovering and tracking the ecological drivers behind spillover events -factors such as climate, land use and population migrations. In addition, non-governmental organizations funded by USAID and Google.org, such as EcoHealth Alliance and Global Viral Forecasting, Inc., have established international disease surveillance systems in wild animals to monitor the potential for spillover outbreaks.
There are also ongoing efforts funded by the National Institutes of Health Fogarty International Center and the Department of Homeland Security Research and Policy for Infectious Disease Dynamics (RAPIDD) to model the evolutionary drivers behind species jumps -the genetic changes that viruses undergo as they acquire the ability to infect new host species. However, no single funding agency has a mandate to develop a surveillance capability to predict viral species jumps -that is, to support the longitudinal field and laboratory research necessary to develop and test hypotheses about how viruses evolve to infect and sustainably spread among new hosts. Fortunately, field and laboratory data generated by infectious disease ecology studies can help to elucidate how viral species jumps occur. Thus, current progress toward predicting spillover events enables future progress toward predicting species jumps.
Further, the term "predict" is itself problematic, because societies have pressing needs for accurate predictions that go unmet (e.g., of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions). A tangible example in daily life is the prediction of weather, made possible by vast amounts of continuously collected time-series data. The types of precipitation are well characterized, and the impact of annual temperature variations is understood. In other words, a framework of understanding exists for weather, and this framework -combined with data collectionenable construction of sophisticated models that give high-resolution, by-the-hour predictions of weather with acceptable margins of error.
To extend the weather analogy further, predictive virus surveillance is at a Farmer's Almanac stageobserving seasonal ecological phenomena (e.g., rainfall, vegetation cover) that drive spillover events and looking retrospectively for evolutionary drivers among viruses that have already jumped to humans. These efforts are necessary but not sufficient to build a framework of understanding for how species jumps occur -more continuous data are needed if prediction of viral species jumps is the goal. Many viral data sets already exist that could illuminate tropism (which virus infects which tissues in which species), virulence (severity of disease) and transmissibility (contagiousness, or potential to spread). With sufficient quantities of relevant data and a mechanistic framework of understanding, more sophisticated models could be built to make testable predictions. In the short term, such models would have significant impact on detecting spillover events, and in the long term they could aid prediction of species jumps. (Lim et al. 2006) . (VSV is a pathogen of major agricultural importance because it causes symptoms that are clinically indistinguishable from those caused by foot-and-mouth disease virus in hoofed animals.) In the long term, the data repository could be expanded to include data from additional virus, host, vector and reservoir species.
Data Acquisition
Text Mining the Scientific Literature. Obtaining input data ( Figure 1 ) will require a three-pronged strategy. First, the scientific literature contains decades' worth of research on viruses, animal hosts, vectors, and their interactions in the environment Purple boxes represent types of input data that can be acquired by text mining, database mining, and data contributions from users. Inputs shown in red text may be incomplete for a given virus-host system. Blue boxes represent the SJOne informatics platform comprised of a data repository and a workbench. The curated data repository stores data acquired from the scientific literature, public databases and contributions. The workbench is the user interface that provides tools to analyze, share and visualize data; to build and test models; and to upload new data into the user workspace. Green boxes represent user communities and the types of benefits they can extract from SJOne.
(ecology). Within these research reports are data that are relevant to viral species jumps -for example, the protein receptors that viruses use to enter host cells, or sequences from viral evolution experiments. However, the relevant data are stovepiped among specialty journals that cater to distinct disciplines (e.g., ecologists, virologists, evolutionary biologists) with limited crossdisciplinary interactions. Information isolated within sub-disciplinary journals hampers progress toward a unified mechanistic framework of understanding for viral species jumps, which will require crosscutting data. Identifying the relevant extant data will require mining the scientific literature using tools borrowed from information extraction (IE), information retrieval (IR) and text mining fields. For example, PubGene 1 is an IE tool that enables users to search across millions of literature records in the National Library of Medicine's PubMed database for information on genes and their associated proteins (without prior knowledge of synonymous names). An alternate approach is an IR system like Textpresso, 2 which allows researchers to search for keywords that appear within a body (corpus) of sentences extracted from the scientific literature (Muller et al. 2004 ). This exposes researchers to associations they might otherwise miss because it bridges bioscience sub-disciplines in ways that manual review does not permit. Also promising is prospective use of text mining tools like Arrowsmith, 3 which enables users to discover keyword connections between two PubMed searches that they designate. The ability to explore non-obvious connections between disparate sub-disciplines enables investigators to explore new hypotheses, which is a key requirement for discovering how species jumps occur. Data Mining. Second, there are important data that reside in public databases -for example, nucleic acid sequences in GenBank and the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL) database. (For an annotated list of genomic databases and analytical resources, see Appendix 1.) Users could retrieve and analyze such data without having to leave SJOne -thus SJOne must acquire public data that users need, either by retrieving those data ondemand from public databases or collecting them in the data repository.
Data Contributions. Third, and most challenging, is solicitation of data contributions by individual field and laboratory teams. A lag exists between the time data are collected and the time when results are published, and even the most expeditious journals require time for peer review. Furthermore, not all collected data appear in published form, so the literature is not representative of all data collected. Therefore, acquisition of raw data donated by the collecting investigators would enable SJOne users to analyze those data in novel ways and build more accurate models informed by extended datasets. While scientific culture does not currently favor raw data sharing, there are indications that the culture will shift in response to 1) new funding requirements (e.g., the National Science Foundation's Data Sharing Policy 4 ); 2) new ways to tag donated data to compel recognition for the donor; and 3) changing academic attitudes that place greater value on data sharing when assessing tenure or promotion eligibility. (For pertinent discussion of both data sharing issues and the utility of federated data archives, see Reichman et al. 2011.) Analytical and Modeling Tools Once relevant data are collated, they need to be analyzed, and results of these analyses must be visualized (and ideally, shared ) that additionally contains surveillance data from samples collected in the field. In IRD, field sample data can be visualized spatially on a searchable map. Other types of data that exist in IRD and can be applied to ViPR include laboratory-generated data (from cell culture and animal studies) and clinical data. Highly relevant to understanding species jumps is the capability in IRD to examine known functional regions of viral genes and proteins and, using these sequence features (SF), to make comparisons across different viral strains to determine how greatly these SF vary. Scheuermann and colleagues are currently adding SF for dengue, hepatitis C and pox viruses by manually searching the literature; in the future they will begin an automated information extraction process to capture SF from other virus families residing in external data repositories. ViPR is a community resource that could be expanded like its IRD predecessor to include extensive laboratory-generated data from cell culture and animal studies.
Text and data mining tools would be used to acquire data for the curated data repository; in turn, the workbench would provide users with these same tools for intra-and extra-repository mining. In this way, users could mine curated data within the repository, as well as outside data sources, and import these data into their personal workspaces. The strength of this approach lies in the ability to quantify whether such correlations are statistically significant (and hence worthy of further inquiry (Jensen et al. 2006) . Workshop 7 participant Hsinchun Chen, Professor and Director of the University of Arizona's Artificial Intelligence Lab, is the developer of the BioPortal information system. BioPortal has been applied to international foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) surveillance using field data sets collected from veterinary reference laboratories and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and curated by members of the University of California Davis FMD Lab. The FMD BioPortal 7 integrates FMD virus genomic data with these field datasets and uses modeling tools to forecast geographical spread of FMD virus. Also integrated is a News component, which searches web-based news sources (e.g., Google, Yahoo) for FMD outbreak events. While specific to one virushost system, the FMD BioPortal is an established informatics platform with components that could be applied to SJOne for understanding species jumps.
FIELD SAMPLING PLAN
There are historical examples of viral species jumps that have profoundly affected human society, the most recent being the emergence of SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV). Learning from these outbreaks post facto is stymied by the absence of data from the primary events that catalyzed the outbreak. Workshop participant James Lloyd-Smith and colleagues (Pepin et al. 2010) pointed out that the evolutionary driver of the SARS-CoV jump cannot be discerned by available data from palm civet and human samples. In order to learn more today about the 2003 SARS-CoV jump, sustained sampling from animal and recipient hosts would have had to be done in the past, contemporaneous with the time of the outbreak. In other words, the opportunity is lost. A more recent paper makes the same point for 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus -that a lack of surveillance data hampers reconstruction of that virus's origins (Vijaykrishna et al. 2011) .
There is an unmet need to have well-tested sampling plans that can be executed when human outbreaks first originate from an animal host, as in the case of SARS. The sampling strategy should be capable of identifying and discriminating positive selection (i.e., increases in viral fitness) from adaptive finetuning (changes in an already well-adapted virus).
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Such data would make rigorous modeling of species jumps possible and further the understanding required to make predictions possible.
We suggest development of statistically supported field sampling plans to detect evolutionary drivers that could precede viral species jumps. These plans can be deployed proactively (at viral "hotspots" where spillover has occurred and jumps are anticipated) and reactively (for rapid deployment at early outbreak stages where viral species jumps are nascent or suspected). While the primary objective of a traditional outbreak response is to prevent loss of life, the primary objective of the proposed field sampling plans would be to acquire data that are
Box 1: Species Jumps by SARS Coronavirus
The process of genetic adaptation for human infection by species-jumping viruses may entail an iterative series of adaptations to different hosts. SARS coronavirus, for example, originated in bats but contains gene sequences derived from both mammalian-and avian-adapted ancestral viruses (Wang & Eaton 2007) . The ancestral SARS-like bat virus subsequently jumped to humans after infecting at least two wild mammalian species (palm civet, raccoon dog) that were commercially raised and sold for food in China as well as acquiring a 29-base pair deletion that increased the ability of the SARS virus to infect and transmit in human hosts (Guan et al. 2003) .
only available from animal and human hosts near the time of a species jump. As such, these field sampling plans should be deployed independently from traditional responses yet share relevant data with traditional responders.
Reactive (post-outbreak) public health sampling is primarily focused on contact tracing and trace-back to an index case. These strategies were designed to identify disease sources, but not to discover the drivers that enabled and preceded outbreaks. Representative sampling of aquatic, terrestrial and captive animal populations is distinct and more challenging than medical contact tracing, in which case the probability of detection (P d ) of a pathogen is high since infected patients are readily identified. By contrast, the probability of detection for zoonotic viruses in animal populations is low because the ecobiology (host/reservoir/vector dynamics) of many virus-host systems is not well understood. We suggest that environmental sampling design principles, traditionally focused on discovering chemical and radiological contamination, provide models and strategies that may be suited for environmental sampling of zoonotic viruses.
Traditional environmental sampling entails collection of samples that are representative of a large area and that are statistically representative of that area. Representative sampling enables one to draw defensible conclusions about viral abundance and distribution within the larger area (and thus reduce cost).
The advantage of proactive (background) sampling done with sufficient sensitivity and over a sustained time period is that a time series of pre-emergent species jump processes, dynamics and signals could be accessed, which would allow de novo modeling and simulation of disease emergence. These models could then be tested and refined to evaluate their predictive power. An example of this strategy is a sustained three year study by Drexler et al. (2011) of emerging coronaviruses and astroviruses in a bat colony. Viral emergence and loads were assessed quantitatively over the entire study period. These data illuminated with fine-grained time resolution how bat colonies experienced and controlled viral infections. Another longitudinal study of viruses in a wild bat colony was presented by Linfa Wang (of Australia's Commonwealth Scientific and
Box 2: Knowing the Baseline: the Need for Background Sampling
A recurring theme at the workshop was the need to "know the baseline" of viruses occurring within their natural hosts, namely which viruses infect which host, vector and reservoir species at given places and times. Without such data, the significance of detecting a virus in an animal at any given place or time is uncertain. For example, detection of Reston ebolavirus (REBOV) in pigs made international news, and is significant both in its novelty and its unclear risk to human populations. However, it may be that pigs are historical hosts of REBOV globally, and that this detection is therefore not indicative of increased risk to humans. Without knowing the distribution of REBOV in pigs across space and time, the associated risk cannot be estimated.
Industrial Research Organisation, CSIRO) at the 2011 International Meeting for Emerging Diseases and Surveillance (IMED)
. For this study, weekly bat urine samples are collected and tested using PCR, viral culture and sequencing; study results are not yet published. While longitudinal sampling is more time consuming and labor intensive than sampling at one time point, it is essential for capturing the dynamics and variations in genetic signatures of viral evolutionary change.
Environmental background sampling for species jumps will require well designed and statistically supported plans that provide accurate estimations of P d from pre-event surveys. In contrast to post-event grab sampling (i.e., collecting one sample at one time), pre-event sampling methods will require utilization of designs developed for environmental contaminant and ecological surveys. These modalities include random, targeted, random grid, stratified, random stratified and transect methodologies (Box 3). P d can also be increased by the use of adaptive sampling strategies that adjust the sampling plan based on near real-time data obtained from field bioassays. Selection of the most appropriate approach should be driven by a thorough and prior assessment of the data quality objectives (DQO) for
To maximize the probability of detection (P d ) of a target (in this case, a virus) within a given area (e.g., multiple adjacent bat roosting sites), a site-specific sampling plan is required. Two key components of a sampling plan are sampling designs and data quality objectives (DQO).
Sampling Designs:
There are numerous sampling designs appropriate for different sites, budgets and objectives. One can test the sensitivity of sampling designs using statistical tools like logistic regression to construct detection curves, which relate the sample numbers and the density of targets to P d . This approach can help to reduce false negatives and increase the ability to detect rare viruses at low densities by enabling refinement of sampling strategies. Data Quality Objectives: DQO are essentially standards that investigators set prior to sampling to insure that resulting data are representative, sufficient and usable. Some examples of DQO are:
• Sample numbers, collection points, analysis methods (e.g., viral genome sequencing)
• Sample documentation (e.g., photograph, video, manual logbook, barcode, GPS coordinates)
• Data management (e.g., electronic file format, spreadsheet, database, web-based platform)
• Quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) (e.g., number of sample replicates, sample blanks)
• Statistical tools to measure data representativeness, sufficiency and usability (e.g., variance, sample size, standard error)
Well-developed DQO are required to determine whether a sampling design or site is worth extensive evaluation. As such, DQO figure heavily in cost-benefit analyses. For example, calculating the minimum number of samples required for representativeness (sample size) enables investigators to in turn calculate the minimum investment required. 
PILOT STUDIES
Thus far we have proposed informatics and field sampling strategies to better understand how viral species jumps occur and better enable their prediction in future. Finally, we suggest pilot studies that will close gaps in SJOne as well as provide opportunities to exercise background sampling plans. Since emerging viruses with a history of human spillover may evolve to jump into human hosts, we see an opportunity to leverage and augment current research efforts to include collection of field and laboratory data to specifically determine differences between viral strains that exhibit host-specific differences in pathogenicity. Ripe for study are the genetic and phenotypic differences between Nipah and Nipah-like viruses in pig, bat and human hosts as well as differences between Ebola virus strains that are pathogenic or non-pathogenic in humans. Finally, we discuss the prospect of horizontal gene transfer as a key enabler of species jumps.
Nipah and Nipah-like Viruses
Henipaviruses are an important group of emerging zoonotic RNA viruses whose primary hosts are large fruit bats of the genus Pteropus. Henipaviruses include Hendra and Nipah species, which have been isolated from bats in Australia, Asia, Africa, and Madagascar (Hayman et al. 2008; Epstein et al. 2008) . Hendra viruses from Australian fruit bats have caused small, isolated fatal disease outbreaks among horses and fatal spillover cases among humans exposed to infected horses (Plowright et al. 2011) , while Nipah viruses from the Asian mainland have caused major outbreaks involving pigs, humans, horses, cats, dogs, goats, and chickens (Bunning 2001) . Although humanto-human transmission of Nipah virus was never reported from Malaysia and Singapore, where fatal human cases were first observed in conjunction with mass outbreaks in domestic pigs Chew et al. 2000) , a number of subsequent Nipah outbreaks in Bangladesh and eastern India have been associated with exposure to bat-contaminated palm tree sap and iterative human-to-human transmission events (Chadha et al. 2006; Gurley et al. 2007; Luby et al. 2009a Luby et al. , 2009b . As-yet unnamed Henipahviruses have been detected in fruit bats in northern India, West Africa and Madagascar, although no species jumps or spillover events have been detected in humans or domesticated animal species (Iehlé et al. 2007; Hayman et al. 2008; Epstein et al. 2008) .
Detailed analyses of genomic differences between Nipah virus strains from Malaysia and Singapore and those from Bangladesh and India could be designed to identify the genetic basis for humanto-human transmission capability in Nipah viruses, because human-to-human transmission of Nipah virus has occurred in India and Bangladesh, but has not been reported from human outbreaks in Malaysia and Singapore. (This assumes that such differences in transmission to humans are not due to uneven reporting of human infections or human host genetic variation.) Such analyses could be performed using laboratory data (e.g., characterization of variant viral proteins and their functions in host cells in vitro) as well as field data (e.g., sequences from longitudinally collected samples). Of greatest impact would be studies that are designed to fill extant data gaps and collect data that can be shared with other stakeholders via platforms like SJOne.
Ebola Viruses
There are five known species of Ebola virus: Bundibugyo, Cote d'Ivoire, Reston, Sudan and Zaire. The relative virulence of these viruses varies greatly among infected humans and other mammalian species. Zaire and Sudan ebolaviruses are associated with mortality rates of 50-90% in humans, while Côte d'Ivoire ebolavirus has only been reported from a non-fatal human case and Reston ebolavirus is only associated with asymptomatic infections in humans (Towner et al. 2008; Bausch 2011) .
Reston ebolavirus causes asymptomatic infections in domestic pigs, while Zaire ebolavirus has been associated with fatal infections of wild African pigs (Lahm et al. 2007 ) and shown experimentally to cause symptomatic disease associated with pigto-pig transmission in domestic swine (Kobinger et al. 2011) . The natural host reservoirs for these viruses are currently unknown, although there is evidence that certain species of African fruit bats may serve as reservoirs (Biek et al. 2006; Porrut et al. 2009 ). The closely-related Marburg virus has been recovered from the Rousettus aegyptiacus fruit bat, and human spillover cases have been linked to exposure to bats in caves where infected bats were recovered ). Detailed analyses of genomic differences among Ebola virus species could reveal clues as to why certain viruses can infect multiple host species without causing disease in all of them. Much remains unknown about the mechanisms these viruses use to infect hosts. Only very recently was a human host receptor identified for Zaire ebolavirus and Lake Victoria Marburg virus (Kondratowicz et al. 2011 ) -despite a decades-long history of human spillover.
Horizontal Gene Transfer
Genetic changes resulting from the acquisition of new genes or sequences can be an important factor in viral species jumps. Horizontal gene transfer (HGT) is a type of gene flow that occurs in bacteria and viruses, which can produce new strains with enhanced virulence and the ability to infect new hosts. Although HGT occurs more frequently in bacteria, several families of viruses (including Poxvirus and Herpesvirus species) are known to have acquired genes from hosts through HGT (Fu et al. 2008; Monier et al. 2009; Odom et al. 2009 ). HGT may occur between host cells and viruses as well as between viruses themselves (Liu et al. 2010) . The incorporation of host genes into viral genomes may facilitate transmission and modulate host immune response mechanisms (Odom et al. 2009 ). Recent research suggests that HGT between double-stranded RNA viruses and non-bacterial hosts occurs quite frequently, and may give rise to functionally important new genes in host genomes that play a role in host evolution (Liu et al. 2010) .
Workshop participant David Krakauer, Professor and Chair of the Faculty at the Santa Fe Institute, cited evidence of HGT among bacterial species (Ochman et al. 2000) as examples of ancient species jumps. Monitoring genomic change over time will reveal evolutionary changes in viral strains, but if species jumps are made possible by HGT (e.g., gene exchange between co-infecting viruses in a single host), then these abrupt changes might not be foreseen in timely fashion. Theoretical work presented by Michael Deem, Professor at Rice University, reinforced the importance of HGT as a major mechanism for generating viral protein diversity (Bogarad & Deem 1999) . However, the frequency and significance of HGT among emerging viruses are understudied, so it is difficult to determine the contributions that HGT make to viral species jumps. Krakauer presented a "core and satellite" model for viruses, in which a highly conserved genetic core is orbited by less conserved satellite genes, with the totality being equal to the viral genome. Krakauer and colleagues compared core and satellite genes from four DNA virus families and found that viruses with smaller genomes are more promiscuous in their ability to acquire satellite genes from other viral species. This analysis also found that these viruses were more likely to gain satellite genes than to lose them (Zanotto & Krakauer 2008) .
If it is true that species jumps may result from gene gain, and that viruses with smaller genomes are more likely to acquire genes, then smaller viruses may be more likely to jump hosts. However, it is important to note that this analysis was performed using DNA viruses; it remains to be seen whether the correlation between genome size and promiscuity holds for RNA viruses. Holmes and Rambaut (2004) , while acknowledging that coronaviruses are among the few RNA viruses known to undergo HGT, argue against HGT as a mechanism for the SARS coronavirus species jump to humans. They and others (Pepin et al. 2010) point out that the available sample size is too small to draw conclusions about the evolutionary history of SARS coronavirus, and suggest that biosurveillance systems tailored to recognize salient changes in viral fitness could cue early warning of species jumps like the one behind the 2003 SARS outbreak. We therefore propose additional coronavirus pilot studies, such as those described by Drexler et al. (2011) , be expanded in scope beyond PCR assessment of viral load, to include complete genomic analysis of how bat colony coronavirus isolates evolve over space and time.
It is unclear whether gene gains could be detected in a timely fashion -that is, before a virus jumps and causes outbreaks in a new host species. In this case, surveillance for gene gains may not enable prediction, but could be used for early detection and mitigation. For example, if gene gains were detected early in an outbreak, then more rigorous mitigation strategies could be implemented to prevent transmission and ward off a potential species jump. A recent study has demonstrated that longitudinal surveys can detect HGT, as well as rare viral sequences (Vijaykrishna et al. 2011) . A 12-year surveillance study of influenza viruses in Hong Kong swine found evidence of one HGT that occurred repeatedly, suggesting that this HGT is not random but a response to evolutionary pressure on the virus. This study also demonstrates that longitudinal surveys enable detection of rare viral sequences -known to be rare because they occur among a large number of total samples collected. Detection of rare sequences further enabled investigators to hypothesize that they were poorly adapted for large-scale spread, because they "died out" over time. Ultimately, more data from longitudinal studies of different virus-host systems will bolster the framework of understanding for how species jumps occur.
CONCLUSION
Currently, most zoonotic surveillance efforts seek ecological drivers of spillover events -factors like climate, land use and population migrations driving infections that do not spread between humans. By contrast, we focus here on the evolutionary drivers of species jumps -the genetic changes over time driving infections that spread efficiently among humans. We see an opportunity to use field surveillance and laboratory data to improve understanding of how viral species jumps occur, and have suggested three approaches to build a mechanistic framework of understanding: by curating extant data and fusing them with new and existing bioinformatics tools in SJOne; by generating new field sampling plans informed by environmental contaminant and ecological surveys; and by pursuing pilot studies likely to yield new data of direct relevance to species jumps. With a mechanistic framework of understanding bolstered by sufficient quantities of relevant data, more sophisticated models can be built, and the risks posed by viral species jumps can be calculated, managed and someday predicted.
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The NCBI Viral Genomes Resource currently contains 3764 Reference Sequences for 2567 viral genomes and 41 Reference Sequences for viroids, and about 6,500 additional complete sequences for more than 1,500 different viral species. Whenever more than one complete genome for a species is available, a pairwise global alignment of a reference sequence with each additional sequence is provided.
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